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ments under its NPDES permit. Acknowledging water in the storm sewer system showed levels of pollutant discharges exceeding statutory limits, the district
court nevertheless granted summary judgment in favor of the District. Specifically, because the district court found many other entities had also discharged
into the water system, jointly contributing to the levels of pollution, the district
court ruled the record was insufficient to hold the District solely liable for the
pollution.
Respondents appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit ("Court of Appeals"), which reversed the district court in part,
holding a "discharge of pollutants" within the meaning of the CWA occurred
when polluted water left the District's concrete channel system and entered
downstream waterways without concrete linings. Because the District controlled the concrete portions of the system, the Court of Appeals held it was
responsible for discharges leaving its system into those watercourses unprotected by concrete lining.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider just one
issue: whether, under the CWA, does the flow of storm water out of a concrete channel within a river qualify as the "discharge of a pollutant?" Answering that question the negative, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals. The
Court relied on legal precedent that held pumping polluted water from one
part of a water body into another part of the same body is not considered a
discharge of pollutants under the CWA.
The language of CWA defines "discharge of a pollutant" as the addition
of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source. The Court pointed
to the generally accepted meaning of the word "add" and explained that pollutants are not "added" when water is merely transferred between different portions of that water body. If such an addition were to be considered a discharge,
the Court explained, the water would have to be transferred between two
meaningfully distinct water bodies.
Ultimately, the Court held the flow of water from an improved portion of
a navigable waterway into an unimproved portion of the same waterway does
not qualify as a discharge of pollutants under the CWA. Therefore, the Court
reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Tyler Geisert
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
San Luis Unit Food Producers v. United States, 709 F.3d 798 (9th Cir.
2013) (holding the Reclamation Act, Central Valley Project Act, and San Luis
Act, did not impose a duty on the Bureau of Reclamation to provide farmers
with their preferred amount of water from the Central Valley Project).
In 1902, Congress passed the Reclamation Act ("Act"), which provided
for the construction and operation of water collection, storage, and distribution
projects in several of the Western States, in an effort to reclaim arid lands and
support agriculture. The nation's largest reclamation project, the Central Valley Project ("CVP"), managed by the United States Bureau of Reclamation
("Bureau"), provides water to California's Central Valley.
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In 1960, Congress passed the San Luis Act, authorizing the construction
and' operation of the San Luis Unit, an integral part of the CVP. In 1992,
Congress passed the Central Valley Project Improvement Act ("CVPIA"),
amending the purposes formerly enumerated for in the CVP. The CVPIA
established river regulation, improvement of navigation, and flood control as
CVP's first priorities. The CVPIA listed irrigation, domestic uses, fish and
wildlife protection, and restoration as a second priority. For several decades,
the Bureau delivered enough water to adequately irrigate farmers' lands in the
area. However, when the Bureau began allowing significant amounts of water
to flow free for the restoration of fish and wildlife, it significantly decreased the
amount of water delivered to irrigation districts. As a result, the Bureau caused
a decrease in the amount of irrigation water available to farmers in the Central
Valley.
A group of farmers ("Farmers") sued the Bureau, claiming various statutes, including the Reclamation Act, CVP Act, and San Luis Act, required the
Bureau to deliver an amount of water to inigation contractors, consistent with
historical use. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California granted summary judgment in favor of the Bureau, and the Farmers
appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ("Court of
Appeals") reviewed the case de novo.
On appeal, Farmers argued the Bureau violated its statutory duties to (i)
"operate" the San Luis Unit in a manner that fully utilizes it for irrigation
above other purposes; (ii) to exercise its water rights to San Luis water; and (iii)
to adequately recoup Project costs.
First asserting the Bureau has a duty to operate the San Luis Unit in a
manner fully utilizing the water for irrigation purposes, the Farmers cited 43
U.S.C. § 521, which authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to contract with
CVP water users to supply water for non-irrigation purposes, so long as there
is no detriment to irrigation purposes. Farmers alleged the Bureau's reallocation of water to support fish and wildlife was detrimental to the irrigation
project and caused them injury. The Court of Appeals held the Bureau did
not contract to provide water for the protection of fish and wildlife, but was
required to do so by CVPIA. Thus, the Court of Appeals determined that the
Farmers did not sufficiently identify a contract that caused the harm.
Farmers also cited the CVP Act's provision for the sale of electric energy,
to allow full utilization of the CVP and accomplish the CVP's purposes of
river regulation, irrigation, and other uses. The Farmers again argued that the
Bureau must use CVP project water for irrigation purposes before other nonirrigation purposes. The Court of Appeals concluded that the Bureau did deliver water to irrigation contractors and the CVP Act does not require the delivery of any particular amount of water.
Farmers also relied on the San Luis Act, which states that the "principle
purpose" of the San Luis Unit is to provide water for irrigation, and specifies
necessary water capture, storage, and distribution features of the unit. Farmers
argued the language of the San Luis Act.created a mandatory duty to deliver
Farmers' preferred amount of irrigation water prior to supplying water for fish
and wildlife protection efforts. The Court of Appeals held the statute did not
create a duty on the Bureau to distribute a specific amount of water for irriga-
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tion, but merely described the necessary engineering features of the San Luis
Unit.
Farmers next argued the Reclamation Act directed the Secretary of the Interior to use Bureau funds for the operation and maintenance of reclamation
projects. Farmers argued the word "operation" meant "utilization of the works
as fully practicable," and the Bureau must operate projects to the fullest practicable extent for irrigation before supplying water for non-irrigation purposes.
The Court of Appeals ultimately held the Reclamation Act does not affirmatively require any particular managerial action on the part of the Bureau.
Farmers further argued the Bureau had a duty, under the Reclamation
Act, to exercise its water rights within the San Luis Unit and to provide water
to irrigation districts, consistent with the amount historically used. The Reclamation Act does require the Bureau to comply with any state water law restrictions that are consistent with federal law. Under section 1702 of the Califoria Water Code, the State Water Resources Control Board ("Board") cannot grant a permit holder's application for a change in the "purpose of use" of
a permit unless the change will not injure any legal user. Farmers claimed the
Bureau's reduction in water collection to support fish and wildlife protection
efforts changed the "purpose of use" and caused them injury, thus violating
section 1702. The Court of Appeals held the plain meaning of section 1702
required the Board to make a "no injury" finding, but that section 1702 was in
no way controlling over actions of the Bureau.
Farmers next argued the Reclamation Act provides that water rights acquired under the Act belong to the land irrigated and are measured by beneficial use. Farmers asserted they were entitled to the amount of water historically
put to beneficial use. The Court of Appeals held the statement that "the beneficial use of water is the 'measure' of a water right," was too vague to be interpreted as a directive to the Bureau to deliver Farmers' preferred amount of
irrigation water.
Farmers also cited the San Luis Act, which provides that construction of
the San Luis unit would not begin until the Secretary of the Interior was able
to secure the necessary water rights to satisfy the purposes of the Unit. The
Farmers alleged that non-irrigation use or non-use of water compromised the
Bureau's ability to satisfy the purposes of the Unit and was therefore impermissible under the San Luis Act. The Court of Appeals, however, held the
statute only imposed a condition on the construction of the San Luis Unit and
did not require that the Bureau deliver a certain amount of irrigation water
prior to providing for fish and wildlife protection efforts.
Last, Farmers claimed the CVP required the Bureau to recover the costs
associated with the construction, operation, and maintenance of the CVP
through the sale of more irrigation water. The Court of Appeals disagreed,
holding Congress intended those benefiting from reclamation projects to recover costs and the Secretary of the Interior to determine how to best recoup
those costs. Therefore, the Court of Appeals held Farmers could not compel
the Bureau to sell more irrigation water in order to recoup costs.
. The Court of Appeals accordingly affirmed the district court's grant of
summary judgment to the Bureau and further held that none of the statutes
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Farmers cited imposed a duty on the Bureau to deliver the preferred amount
of water to Farmers' irigation contractors.

Holly Taylor
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF
NEVADA
United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 2012 WL 4442804 (D.
Nev. 2012) (holding the state engineer did not err in (i) finding special administration rules under the Alpine Decree provided a change in point of diversion from one segment to another on the Carson River required an accompanying change in priority date; (ii) finding a constructive point of diversion, rather than a physical point of diversion, for the purposes of retaining priority
would violate Nevada water law; and (iii) granting the change applications, as
filed, would harm existing rights).
The United States District Court for the District of Nevada ("district
court") issued the Alpine Decree in a previous ruling as a means of administering Carson River water rights. In the summer, some upper segments of the
river are dry, while downstream segments have sufficient flows due to underground drainage or return flows from irrigation. During such conditions, it is
physically futile for upstream junior appropriators to satisfy downstream senior
appropriators' calls. Historically, farmers in the Carson River region administered the river in segments through mutual cooperation and practical experience with the physical limitations. The Alpine Decree formally divided the
Carson River into eight segments and established autonomous administration
of each segment.
The United States Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS") filed seven applications with the Nevada State Engineer to change several of its water rights to the
Stillwater National Wildlife Refuge. As part of its effort to restore and sustain
the Lahontan Valley wetlands, FWS purchases water rights from willing sellers,
and then applies to transfer those water rights for application in the Refuge.
Each of the water rights was in the Carson River and listed the point of diversion as Buckland Ditch. Buckland Ditch is a point in Segment 7(e) of the Carson River as designated by the Alpine Decree. The State Engineer denied
FWS's applications, reasoning the applications, as filed, would harm existing
rights holders because the actual point of diversion would have been the Carson Dam, a point in Segment 8 downstream of the Buckland Ditch. FWS
appealed the State Engineer's ruling to the district court.
On appeal, FWS claimed the State Engineer erred in (i) interpreting the
Alpine Decree to require a change in priority when the point of diversion is
changed to another segment of the Carson River; (ii) finding a constructive
point of diversion, rather than a physical point of diversion for the purposes of
retaining priority because it would violate Nevada water law; (iii) applying the
wrong legal standard; (iv) relying on an extra-record comment when interpreting the Alpine Decree; and (v) denying the applications rather than granting
them with conditions.
First, the district court found the State Engineer correctly interpreted the
Alpine Decree to require a change in priority date when an application for a

